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U
Prior Inconsistent Statements
by H. Patrick Furman
T he testimony of witnesses usu-ally makes or breaks a case.Impeaching a witness with aprior nc sistent stat ment
can be an effective way to impeach the
witness' credibility and turn a jury
around. However, the use of a prior in-
consistent statement has certain dan-
gers (including that of rehabilitation of
the witness with prior consistent state-
ments) which must be evaluated before
this type of impeachment is conducted.
This article attempts to summarize the
state court rules concerning the use of
prior inconsistent statements.'
Methods of Use
The use of prior inconsistent state-
ments is governed by one statute and
two evidentiary rules. The statute, CRS
§ 16-10-201, enacted in 1972, establishes
a method for admitting prior inconsis-
tent statements as substantive evi-
dence. C.R.E. 613 governs the use of
prior inconsistent statements for im-
peachment purposes and C.R.E. 801(d)(1)
eliminates, in certain situations, the pos-
sible hearsay objection to the use of
either consistent or inconsistent prior
statements. The method for admitting a
prior inconsistent statement turns on
the purpose for which the prior state-
ment is being admitted.
Impeachment Use
C.R.E. 613, adopted in 1980, retains
the traditional common law foundational
requirements. 3 To admit a statement for
impeachment purposes under C.R.E.
613, the proponent of the statement
Column Ed.: Frank Moya, Denver-
333-8447
must first confront the witness with the
prior statement, and give the witness
an opportunity to explain or deny the
statement.4 If the witness admits having
made the statement, there is no need to
introduce other evidence of the exis-
tence of the statement and, in fact, such
extrinsic evidence is barred.
If the witness denies having made the
prior statement, then, of course, extrin-
sic evidence of the statement is neces-
sary. C.R.E. 613 permits the introduc-
tion of such evidence, which can consist
of the statement itself or the testimony
of a witness who heard the prior state-
ment.6
A prior inconsistent statement admit-
ted under this method can only be used
for impeachment purposes, and an ap-
propriate limiting instruction should be
given to the jury.7
Substantive Evidence Use
It is simpler to admit a prior inconsis-
tent statement for the purpose of sub-
stantive evidence. In addition to the tra-
ditional method under C.R.E. 613, dis-
cussed above, CRS § 16-10-201 provides
that the prior inconsistent statement can
be admitted as substantive evidence any
time the witness who purportedly made
the statement is still available to tes-
tify.8 This condition is met if the court
simply tells the witness to remain avail-
able for recall to the stand.9
The statute does also require that the
prior inconsistent statement purport to
relate to a matter within the witness'
own knowledge.'o However, this condi-
tion rarely adds to the foundational re-
quirements because a witness' testi-
mony normally is limited to matters
within his or her own knowledge."
Once these foundational requirements
are met, the prior inconsistent state-
ment can be used by the jury as substan-
tive evidence. Thus, a statement intro-
duced through this procedure can be
used for the truth of its contents as well
as its impeachment value.12
Contrasting the
Foundational Requirements
Because of the different procedures,
it is easier to introduce a prior inconsis-
tent statement as substantive evidence
than it is to introduce it for the limited
purpose of impeachment. However, the
better practice would be to continue
using the traditional approach of C.R.E.
613 regardless of the purpose for which
admission of the statement is sought.
There are four reasons for this conclu-
sion.
1. From a theoretical point of view, it
is appropriate to require stricter foun-
dational requirements for substantive
evidence than for impeachment evi-
dence. In fact, this is generally the
case.'
3
2. The traditional approach can con-
serve judicial resources. If a witness is
first confronted with the prior inconsis-
tent statement, the witness often admits
having made the statement. If this ad-
mission is made, there is no need to con-
sume time by introducing extrinsic evi-
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dence of the existence of that statement.
Obviously, conserving judicial resources
is not necessarily a client concern. How-
ever, the professional and concise pres-
entation of the case is beneficial to the
client. Factfinders, whether they are
judges or juries, tend to look more favor-
ably on counsel and counsel's case when
evidence is presented in an efficient
manner.
3. The traditional approach is also
fairer to the witness. Seemingly, the log-
ical place to start when dealing with a
prior inconsistent statement is with the
person who made the statement. Fair-
ness suggests that a witness should be
given the opportunity to deny a prior
inconsistent statement or, on the other
hand, to admit it and explain the reasons
for the inconsistency. Both the Colorado
Rules of Evidence' 4 and the Colorado
Code of Criminal Procedure" have fair-
ness as one of their fundamental goals.
The vigorous representation of a client
within the bounds of the law often seems
at odds with the notion of 'fairness.'
However, being fair is, in fact, usually
helpful to the case. Juries are often wise
enough to recognize when a witness is
not being treated fairly by counsel, and
may well discount the cross-examination
and argument of counsel whom they per-
ceive as being unfair.
4. On a more practical level, directly
confronting the witness with the prior
inconsistent statement is usually more
effective. It is more persuasive to con-
front a witness directly with his or her
prior inconsistent statement than it is
to introduce that statement through
another witness after the declarant has
left the stand. If the witness has no ex-
planation for the inconsistency, the jury
sees and hears that fact.
On the other hand, if the witness has
an explanation, opposing counsel will
most likely introduce it. If the witness'
explanation of the inconsistent state-
ment eliminates the value of that state-
ment, the inconsistency probably should
not be introduced at all.
Hearsay Problems
C.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A) eliminates possi-
ble hearsay objections to the admission
of a prior inconsistent statement to im-
peach a witness. A prior statement by
a witness, because it is "a statement
other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hear-
ing,"' 6 would fall under the definition of
hearsay except for the terms of C.R.E.
801(d)(1)(A). That subsection excludes
from the definition of hearsay those
prior statements made by a witness
which are inconsistent with his or her
trial testimony, as long as the witness/
declarant testified at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination con-
cerning the statement.
"The method for admitting
a prior inconsistent
statement turns on the
purpose for which the prior
statement is being admitted."
Other Considerations
Other considerations should be ana-
lyzed in connection with the use of prior
inconsistent statements." Counsel's
questions to the witness must be care-
fully and precisely phrased to pinpoint
the inconsistency without confusing the
jury. Counsel must be prepared to con-
front the witness with the time, date
and location of the statement, as well as
the identity of the person to whom the
statement was made. The statement it-
self must be in hand so that counsel can
directly confront the witness with it if
such a confrontation becomes necessary.
Of course, counsel must take care to
ensure that the prior inconsistent state-
ment is in fact "inconsistent." The Colo-
rado Supreme Court has held that the
prior statement need not be a "patent
contradiction," but does require that
there be a material variance or the omis-
sion of a significant detail which it would
have been natural to mention in the prior
statement. 18
Counsel must also remember that a
defendant who testifies is essentially
subject to the same impeachment with
a prior inconsistent statement as any
other witness. All types of previous
statements may be rendered admissible
by this rule. The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that a defendant who testifies
may be impeached with a prior inconsis-
tent statement obtained in violation of
his or her constitutional rights, as long
as that prior statement was not involun-
tary." The Colorado Supreme Court has
adopted this analysis.20 Illegally seized
physical evidence may also be used to
impeach the testimony of a defendant,
but the contradiction between such
physical evidence and the defendant's
trial testimony must be clear and di-
rect. 21
Similarly, statements made to a psy-
chiatrist in the course of a court-ordered
examination, inadmissible in the prose-
cution's case-in-chief, may be admissible
for impeachment of the defendant. 2 The
Colorado Supreme Court has also held
that statements made by a defendant at
the time he or she entered a plea, which
was subsequently withdrawn, can be
used to impeach the defendant's trial
testimony, although the plea itself is in-
admissible.23
However, the post-arrest silence of a
defendant is not admissible to impeach
trial testimony. This rule is based on
constitutional considerations as well as
on the ambiguity inherent in post-arrest
silence.24 In fact, the inherent ambiguity
in post-arrest silence has led the Colo-
rado Supreme Court to bar the impeach-
ment of a testifying co-conspirator with
his or her post-arrest silence.2 s
Counsel must also be aware that if the
extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsis-
tency comes from his or her investiga-
tion, the use of that inconsistency will
open up to scrutiny that portion of the
investigation. For example, if the ex-
trinsic evidence needed to prove the in-
consistency comes from a defense inves-
tigator, the report from that inves-
tigator must be turned over to the pros-
ecutor. Neither the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel nor the "work product"
doctrine will protect these reports.
Impeachment through prior inconsis-
tent statements may yield itself to crea-
tive use of exhibits. A chart displaying
the inconsistencies by time, date and
place can make an indelible impression
on a jury. Such a chart must be clear
and concise, using only the key words
or phrases in the inconsistent state-
ments. A chart which goes into too much
detail will only confuse a jury.
If counsel is unsuccessful in attempt-
ing to admit a prior inconsistent state-
ment, he or she should make a complete
offer of proof as to what the barred evi-
dence would have revealed. A failure to
do so can result in an appellate court
ruling that there is no showing of preju-
dice as a result of the claimed error.27
Limits on Impeachment
Impeachment with prior inconsistent
statements, as well as other types of im-
peachment, is allowed only on issues
that are relevant to the case at hand and
those which show the bias, interest or
motive of the witness.m Impeachment
on an immaterial matter that does not
go to the credibility of the witness is not
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allowed. 9 Even if relevant, this type of
impeachment may be barred if the issue
is collateral and the unfair prejudice of
the impeachment outweighs the proba-
tive value.30
Rehabilitation
The use of prior inconsistent state-
ments, whether for impeachment or as
substantive evidence, opens the door to
the use of prior consistent statements
on redirect examination to rehabilitate
the witness. These prior consistent
statements are also excluded from the
definition of hearsay in C.R.E. 801 and
are admissible as long as the witness/de-
clarant testified and the prior consistent
statements are offered to rebut an ex-
press or implied charge of recent fabri-
cation or improper influence or motive.a'
Thus, for example, the opposing party
may introduce other portions of the
statement which yielded the inconsis-
tency to show that it also contains consis-
tencies.32 But, the "rule of complete-
ness" does not apply to rehabilitation
with prior consistent statements.33
Counsel who is rehabilitating a witness
will not be able to introduce the entire
prior consistent statement unless the en-
tire statement is necessary for the re-
habilitation. If the original inconsistency
is minor, relates only to a collateral issue
or is simply a small part of an otherwise
consistent statement, counsel must de-
cide if the use of the inconsistency does
more harm than good.
Along these same lines, counsel must
remember that the use of a prior incon-
sistent statement also opens the door to
the use of prior consistent statements
made at some other point in time.3 A
prior consistent statement admitted in
this fashion then comes in to rebut the
inconsistency and rehabilitate the wit-
ness.3 ' This may counterbalance or even
outweigh the benefit derived from the
use of the prior inconsistent statement.
Furthermore, the prior consistent
statement need not be entirely consis-
tent. Some inconsistencies in the state-
ment do not preclude the use of the
statement as long as it is consistent in
the overall sense.3 6
It should also be noted that this type
of rehabilitation may be conducted even
if the impeachment of the witness did
not take the form of prior inconsistent
statements. Other types of impeach-
ment may suffice, as when a witness'
credibility is attacked on the theory that
the witness is trying to gain favors from
the prosecutor. In this situation, the use
of a prior consistent statement for re-
habilitation has been allowed."
Conclusion
The use of the traditional approach,
with its stricter foundational require-
ments, ordinarily is the better practice
from a theoretical, administrative,
equitable and practical point of view.
However, counsel may rely on the stat-
utory procedure for admitting prior in-
consistent statements when he or she
deems necessary. Whichever approach
is used, counsel must analyze all of the
consequences, including the effect of re-
habilitation with prior consistent state-
ments, before using prior inconsistent
statements.
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